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Background
In sub-Saharan Africa, in the recent years, the decline of the welfare state in the provi-
sion of goods and services has seen the rise of housing cooperatives. These are a panacea 
to trying to curb the housing shortage in the urban centers. With reference to devel-
opments in Greater Harare in the post-2000 era, the purpose of this paper is to dem-
onstrate how the role of housing cooperatives, meant to serve a technical problem of 
housing the homeless, has shifted from the mere technical agenda to the political one in 
which clientilism, patronage and manipulation are the manifestations. Greater Harare 
is a metropolitan region comprising Harare City (core), Chitungwiza, Norton, Epworth 
and Ruwa. Although these areas fall under disparate local authorities, they are essen-
tially well connected. Their connectedness is in terms of spatiality, definition of labor 
and business markets, bulk water processing, as well as administration (mainly as Harare 
Metropolitan Province) mean that they strongly rely on each other.
There is paucity of data and case analyses on interplay of politics (particularly dis-
tributive politics) and housing development. This paper argues of a gap in knowledge 
in the understanding the political dynamics surrounding housing cooperatives today. In 
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addition, it argues for the subsumed political connectedness of state apparatus (largely 
in the form of government organizations) that emerges in the urban landscape of cit-
ies in Zimbabwe as responsible institutions seek to discharge their duties. Although, the 
government has failed in a major way, to deliver housing and other public goods, it still 
seeks to control and manipulate the people by seeking to woo support by ‘distributing’ 
land to the homeless especially in days just before elections.
We argue that the dominant resource defining the politicization of the housing coop-
eratives in Zimbabwe in the recent years has been the land. Land is the key resource that 
defines where homebuilders can locate the houses. In this paper, we explain how the rul-
ing party, ZANU PF, which identifies with equity in the distribution of land, has through 
its various apparatus including the institution of the Ministry of Local Government, 
Publics Works and National Housing, has outwitted the MDC. The MDC has enjoyed 
urban votes since 2000. Despite this ‘grace’ of ‘having the people’, it has never taken full 
control of land as a resource that provides the habitation of these people. Besides the 
control of the land resource, ZANU PF, by design or default, identifies with the conserv-
ative agenda. In urban councils, the mayors (or chairpersons of council) together with 
the councilors are predominantly MDC yet the technocrats (appointed officials includ-
ing town clerks, directors and various managers) identify with the conservative agenda 
as prescribed by the law and this tends to identify with the ZANU PF position.
Theory: cooperatives as a political strategy; land as the tool for political favor 
and mass bait
Literature shows how access to land and regime type (whether democratic or authori-
tarian) has become part of distributive politics and clientilism in the housing of urban 
low-income groups in recent years. The use of land as ‘bait’, through election promises 
is well-documented (for example, Boone 2013). After the elections, the poor residents 
become subject to precariousness because there is no security of tenure guaranteed to 
them. The poor often collaborate to mobilize resources instrumental for their self-help 
projects housing included. With reference to India, the Ministry of Agriculture (2009:iv) 
has argued that, “… the cooperative ability not only to help survival of the people but 
also of indirectly forcing the market to behave.” The cooperative approach by poor 
households hinges of the needs and aspirations of the members, a factor which makes 
them strong (internally) (Shankar 2002). Nevertheless, where cooperatives have existed, 
the political processes obtaining in their context usually control their influence. They 
are often apron-tied to the agenda of government. As observed by Birchall (2003:ix), in 
the developing world, cooperatives “… have often been used as tools of development by 
governments that have not allowed them to become fully autonomous, member-owned 
businesses.” Indeed, there may be internal democracy in a cooperative but the politicians 
tend to try to exploit this internal strength of the cooperative to their advantage hence 
the imminence of a clientistic logic. Vote buying, patronage, and machine politics often 
define this logic.
Clientilism fits within a variety of contexts. Hicken (2011:289) argues that “… in the 
face of economic development it often adapts and endures.” It has a variety of outcomes 
including, sometimes subverting democracy and economic development, making it dif-
ficult for citizens to hold their elected official accountable hence tending to reinforce 
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corruption in society. In light of this, Keefer (2007:813) characterizes younger democra-
cies as “… more presidential, fractionalized, and affected by conflict. [There is usually] 
higher rent seeking and less government provision of goods and services of all kinds…” 
politicians often use goods like food, housing and medicines to buy votes from poor 
households. As put across by Kitschelt and Kselman (2012:2) clientelism “… involves an 
exchange in which politicians provide goods and services targeted to individual or small 
groups of voters, contingent on the latter reciprocating by surrendering their vote and 
contributing other services to the politicians’ effort to win electoral office.” Some politi-
cians strive to built long term relationships with their ‘clients’ while others actually foster 
these exchanges into programs and projects (Auyero 1999). An observation by Gans-
Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter (2013:1) is that, “During elections in many countries, clien-
telist parties (or political machines) distribute benefits to citizens in direct exchange for 
political support. Such parties compete not only [because] of policy platforms but also 
with material inducements given to individuals. These inducements often include food, 
medicine, and other forms of sustenance. In contexts where citizens are highly depend-
ent on such handouts, including countries where the state fails to provide a social safety 
net, this pattern of machine politics can have particularly important consequences for 
democratic accountability and responsiveness.”
Arguing about Zambia, Baldwin (2013:807) has analyzed that, “…the political opinions 
of patrons do not cause voters to vote against their political interests but to alter their 
expectations about the performance of candidates in delivering local public goods and 
services.” Thus, voters are usually not coerced but make the choices they make willingly. 
The major determinant of the relationship hinges on the notion of reciprocity. Scott 
(1972:93) has posited that, “in the reciprocity demanded by the relationship each partner 
provides a service that is valued by the other.” The patron may wield authority that the 
client may seek to tap into to access what he or she perceives as desirable. As to whether 
clientilism hooks on poverty, Stokes (2007:618) has argued that “poor people value a 
handout more highly than do wealthy people; hence, if one is going to hand out good-
ies, one will target the poor…” She further argues that “… poor people are risk averse 
and hence value more highly a bag of goodies in hand today than the promise of a redis-
tributive public policy tomorrow…” (ibid). Indeed, for the poor, usually a bird at hand is 
worthy two in the bush. State institutions for public provision may be so incapacitated 
to provide public good and services. This provides a window through which ethnic, sec-
tarian or cooperatives emerge to fill this gap. The leaders can transform (or politicians 
hijack) the cooperatives such that, in the words of Cammett and Issar (2010:417) “… the 
politicization of service provision … can lead to uneven coverage or inequalities that fur-
ther entrench societal divisions….”
With reference to sub-Saharan Africa, van de Walle (2009:3) has observed that, 
“competitive elections shorten the time horizons of governments who are more likely 
to maximize their short term gains from office.” The politicians become ‘innovative’ 
in search for another chance in office. One way to do that is use of political favoritism 
(Kramon and Posner 2013). Land for housing has been used to present such favoritism. 
This is in keeping with Boone (2013:394)’s argument that, “When land and other assets 
are allocated via political hierarchies rather than through impersonal market relation-
ships, voters, citizens, and business people lack the economic and political autonomy 
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that is a sine qua non of liberal democracy. Those who do control access to livelihoods 
and assets have a source of political leverage over citizens that can be deployed to pres-
sure or threaten voters in subtle ways.” Specifically in Zimbabwe, land has been used as a 
good for subverting the landless voters to vote for ZANU PF. Boone (2013:382) explains, 
“In the electoral campaigns of 1990, 1996, and 2000, and 2002, 2004, and 2008, Mugabe 
used promises and plans of land acquisitions and state-sponsored resettlement to rev up 
political support and energize the party’s rural supporters, and to secure the loyalty of 
ZANU-PF hardliners, the military, and rural constituencies through the manipulation of 
land grants.” The rural land agenda later found its way into urban areas given the rising 
demand for housing land. The same land could be offered not merely to a few individuals 
but to those groups that could organize themselves into housing cooperatives.
The concept of distributive politics
Distributive politics is strongly connected to the theory of democratic accountability 
(Golden and Min 2013). If, as Harold Lasswell claimed, politics is all about “who gets 
what, when, how” (Lasswell 1936), then distributive politics, which involves alloca-
tions of government goods and services, lies at the heart of politics. Distributive policies 
involve taxes and transfers, and in particular the decisions about allocations of govern-
ment goods and services to identifiable localities or groups (Golden and Min, 2013). The 
literature on distributive politics and political accountability indicate that political play-
ers use their control over government or public goods to allocate resources to their loyal 
supporters on the basis of political patronage.
Upon grouping themselves in a housing cooperative, the members normally set up a 
committee with a chairperson, vice chairperson, secretary, vice-secretary, a treasurer 
and committee members. The committee is a secretariat whose role is the administra-
tion of the matters that pertain to the cooperative and the housing project. Most coop-
eratives refer to this set up committee as ‘the management’. It has to do the day-to-day 
running of the cooperative business including receiving membership subscriptions, and 
agreed levies and payments as well as attending to membership queries. When houses 
have been built, the management has the role of allocating the houses and to receive 
rentals from the housed members since the houses are not in individual ownership until 
all the members have been built. Moreover, the management has to, from time to time, 
call for meetings to explain to the members of recent developments and plans. Members 
outside the committee, which must hold its office in trusteeship of the entire member-
ship can suggest, proposed and query strategies and methods employed by the man-
agement (committee) in the road to finishing the project. In very normative terms, the 
management is answerable to the membership. It must prepare books and accounts to 
explain income and expenditure as well as ensuring that the cooperative is kept in sound 
governance in keeping with the tenets of good corporate governance—trust, account-
ability, transparency, membership participation, to name these few.
Although the above is the ideal case, practice in the various housing cooperatives 
around the urban centers and in Harare in particular, has shown otherwise. In a num-
ber of situations, there has been fingering of certain of the leaders in gross abuse of 
funds, corruption, bribery and autocracy. The news of such bad cases has often triggered 
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fear and mistrust that cooperatives are useful vehicles for housing delivery for the low-
income groups.
The housing shortage problem in urban Zimbabwe
There has ever been a housing problem ever since the colonial days. The colonial 
regimes managed to keep the problem concealed due to its harsh policies that ensured 
that the black Africans were kept in the rural areas unless they had a defined purpose in 
the city (specifically employment). A variety of statutes including pass and accommoda-
tions laws was crafted to control the numbers of Africans coming to cities. Black African 
women and children were not allowed in the cities. Men were main migrant laborers 
and could return to the rural areas at retirement. In the hotels and apartments that 
were created for the migrant labors, constant inspections were done so that those out of 
employment would be arrested forced back to the rural areas. There were a number of 
squatter camps, which emerged in the colonial days including Chirambahuyo at the edge 
of Harare. The colonial regime was ruthless on the perpetrators and illegal settlements 
were destroyed.
At independence in 1980, the ZANU PF government in powered set to remove the 
inhibitive laws a development that induced post-colonial mass urbanization. Critical to 
note is the homeownership scheme by the state in the early to late 1980s. The govern-
ment might have been playing its role in distributive politics. In the colonial days, the 
bulk of houses for blacks was municipal housing in which the inhabitants got access 
through renting arrangements. The post-independence homeownership scheme was 
implemented to convert the rental housing to ownership so that the burden of mainte-
nance would be transferred to individuals rather than the state. A number of low-income 
housing development schemes were initiated around the country. The major objective of 
these schemes was to address the housing problems which the urban residents were fac-
ing. Various partnerships were created between the state, local banks, finance houses, 
building societies and international organizations such as World Bank, CIDA, SIDA and 
USAID. As the groups of the homeless increased so was the pressure on the state to 
address their plight. A key example of this was the domestic workers in Malbereign in 
Harare who approached the city council and was eventually allocated land in Gilling-
ham to construct the houses. This housing project is what is known as Tashinga Housing 
Cooperative.
State provision of housing deteriorated when the state embarked on economic liberali-
zation in the 1990s in the program that was called the Economic Structural Adjustment 
Program (1991–1995). This has had a negative effect on the production of low-income 
housing in the urban centers. This development propelled low-income earners to pur-
sue self-help housing schemes. There is always inherent politics of rural-land incorpora-
tion into urban; rural local authorities are not always willing to ‘let go’ their land. The 
process is also highly bureaucratic and cumbersome. Before the ‘nationalization’ of land 
with the fast-track land reform program of 2000, urban land incorporation involved seri-
ous dialoguing between the peri-urban farm owners who were not always willing to let 
go their land. Within the government, the process of negotiating for gazzetting of the 
land involved (and still involves) the different government ministries namely the minis-
try of land, the ministry of justice and the ministry of local government. These ministries 
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always have different mandates, which tend to collide making the process clumsy and 
heavy. Meanwhile the pressure for housing land will be mounting and the housing 
backlog ballooning. Another handicap with the fast-track land reform program was its 
unpopularity with the western world, which predominantly had been the major donor in 
housing development. The international community blacklisted Zimbabwe and imposed 
sanctions on its leadership. The country also pulled out of the Commonwealth. These 
developments had negative bearings on the country’s access to critical resources. Eco-
nomic doldrums that characterized the nation starting from 1997 and reaching climax 
in 2008 further exacerbated the situation. Such a situation continued until the setting 
up of the Government of National Unity (GNU) between the three major political par-
ties ZANU-PF, MDC-T and MDC-M in 2009. The GNU lasted 4 years (March 2009 to 
July 2013) when ZANU PF won with the majority and reset itself as the ruling party 
again. The period of the GNU while characterized by stabilization of the economy, did 
not bring much to housing development given the constant bickering between the polit-
ical parties of the matters of constitution making, elections and indigenization of the 
economy.
Concisely, the housing shortage in Zimbabwe is a factor of increasing and uncon-
trolled urbanization entrenched in the lifting of colonial policies and legislations. In 
addition, the globalization agenda of economic reforms have meant the diminishing 
role of the state in the direct provisioning of housing (particularly for the low-income 
groups). The financial resources in the form of housing loans (with the pullout of the 
majority of international organizations that hitherto supported shelter development) 
and the shrinking of the mortgage market explain the lack of robust response to low-
income housing production. In the next section, we explain the factors leading to the 
rise of housing cooperatives in Greater Harare and how these cooperatives seek to define 
themselves and seek recognition both with ZANU PF and with state apparatus, particu-
larly the local government through which housing is located.
The rise of housing cooperatives in greater Harare
In the early years of Zimbabwe’s independence, there was a deliberate promotion by 
government of cooperatives for rural farming and housing construction. During these 
initial years, the state followed a socialist ideology. Specifically in the housing sector, the 
government promoted the idea of building brigades in which families were encouraged 
to pool their resources together to build houses for themselves after the local authorities 
would have availed land for them. Building brigades were to die a natural death because 
their idea was largely received by households extrinsically. There were issues of misman-
agement of resources and internal conflicted with dispirited members. Later, workers 
in the private sectors began to complain to their employees about the need for decent 
accommodation. This was to see a number of work-based cooperatives emerging on the 
scene. Employers served as guarantors for loans obtained by the workers for servicing 
and developing their houses. As many people got retrenched due to ESAP, the work-
based cooperative initiative began to lose its glamour and the now out-of-work lot had 
to device other means to get them housed. They had to ‘hang around’ the cities because 
cities always tend to have better and robust opportunities than rural areas. As they 
stayed in the cities, they needed shelter.
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Unlike in Latin America, Asia and many other parts of Africa where individuals, fami-
lies and households can invade an open space and build then others can follow and clus-
ter around, the non-tolerance of the state of such developments impelled many of these 
individuals, families and households to group together and negotiate for land. The state 
has always followed strict British planning laws and individuals, families and households 
that have always tried to circumvent the procedural laws with regards to land access. 
A critical and hallmark example was the Operation Restore Order (also referred to as 
Operation Murambatsvina) of May–June 2005 in which the individuals, families and 
households that had built their structures and started businesses suffered heavy losses. 
Most of them tried to have layout and building plans to justify why and where they were 
building. However, these plans had not been approved. There was destruction of over 
700,000 businesses and housing structures with depicts a heavy loss to households. Ever 
since this negative development, many households have been careful in their approach 
to accessing land for housing and building. Due to council’s inability to provide land for 
housing, individuals and families have resorted to the formation of co-operatives for 
them to have a collective voice. Once one group has succeeded in championing their 
cause and negotiating with the council, others have always followed suit to do the same.
Cooperators have found out that negotiating with local government officials for hous-
ing and without a patron that identifies with the party that identifies with equity in the 
distribution of land is very difficult. The councilors and mayors in Greater Harare are 
MDC (save for Epworth), they do not have ‘legitimacy’ (at least from the ZANU PF 
perspective) to speak about land. MDC argues that it has the people; ZANU PF argues 
that it has the land because it has advocated strongly for the equitable land distribu-
tion hence the land seizures and subsequent nationalization in 2000. Pressured by the 
woes of inadequate housing, the homeless urban residents have been cowed to identify 
with the ZANU PF land agenda. Because the local authorities can only attend to coop-
eratives and not individuals, the residents also form cooperatives. ZANU PF has been 
encouraged those who want land to build to get into the cooperatives. Once in the coop-
eratives, members must adhere to the requirements of the musangano (as ZANU PF is 
popularly referred to) and pledge their allegiance to vote for it without which the coop-
eratives risk losing their land. Such is the housing and the political landscape that has 
characterized Harare especially in the run-up to the July 31, 2013 Harmonized Elections 
in which ZANU PF won. Although, the party did not garner sufficient votes to get all the 
urban constituencies, it strongly believes that its membership base in the urban centers 
has significantly increased better than in the previous elections of 2000, 2002, 2005 and 
2008. The party has used land as good for enticement of the urban homeless and housing 
cooperatives as a vehicle of achieving its goal of control of the urban citizens.
To ensure that the MDC grip on the urban residents is shattered, the politics of the 
centre and local (the center-local relations) has played out well for ZANU PF. Even in 
negotiating for ministries in the GNU, ZANU PF made it a point that it kept within its 
grip the Ministry of Local Government. This ministry, has since 2002 worked against the 
smooth running of MDC-led councils in the urban centers. It has ever made deliberate 
efforts to ensure that policies mooted by the MDC and meant to improve the physical 
urban landscape as well as the lives of the people are shattered. When the MDC coun-
cilors emerged in the urban scene, the hope of the populace was that this would not work 
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corruptly as ZANU PF had done. Unfortunately, they fell victim to the same cancer that 
the Minister of Local Government then used as a weapon against them. He deliberately 
fired some of the councils (mayors and councilors). Just days to the 2013 Harmonized 
Elections the Minister announced as a directive debt relief on all residents owing coun-
cils in rates and levies. This, in a major way destabilized the smooth running of the urban 
centers. Such a move gave the minister and ZANU PF (where he belongs) applause from 
the people who were failing to settle their debts. However, those who had faithfully paid, 
suffered a loss and the fear is that a new culture of non-payment of bills has set into the 
detriment of good urban functionality. One reason why the minister deliberately allowed 
the local authorities to suffer was the fact that he said they had benefitted from his clem-
ency of allowing them to benefit in salaries and wages at the expense of financing urban 
services, which the generality of the residents have not adequately accessed in the entire 
period of the GNU. The Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29:12) provides the minister of 
local authority with excessive and discretionary powers that he uses, manipulates and 
abuses as and when he feels like doing it.
For a long time, there has been unresponsiveness of the state and the legal framework 
and this has allowed the minister of local government to dictate autocratically what hap-
pens in the local authorities. Although the New Constitution (promulgated in May 2013) 
seeks to annul some of these powers, the new laws that go with the new supreme law of 
the land have not yet been put in place. Meanwhile, the same old and suppressive laws as 
it were continue to dictate the pace and nature of development in the country. Because 
ZANU PF is in control, it sees itself as not in a hurry to implement the provisions of the 
new constitution especially clauses like the devolution of power which it never was in 
support of during the constitution-making process (2009–2013). Such clauses would see 
the powers of the several ministers and the presidency undermined.
It is generally noted that more than 2,600 housing cooperatives have been registered 
countrywide, with more than 1,200 being allocated housing stands (Kachere 2014). In 
Harare, there has been massive development of housing cooperatives, many of which 
are regarded as illegal (Herald 2005). In order to demonstrate how distributive politics 
in urban Harare, data was collected from City of Harare’s Housing and Community Ser-
vices Department on the name of cooperative, number of stands allocated, state of devel-
opment and membership which can be summarised in the following table (see Table 1). 
Just to demonstrate by a few housing cooperatives in Harare, as indicated in Table  1, 
those housing cooperatives connected to ZANU-PF have been allocated more sites to 
develop housing stands than those without political connectedness. This indicates that 
patronage and clientilism play a pivotal role in the allocation of land to housing coopera-
tives. In addition, the level of development and servicing among those housing coopera-
tives connected to ZANU-PF is advanced as compared to those which are not.
Surprisingly, in very recent times (June and July 2015), some of these cooperatives that 
bear the name of liberation war heroes and those who have political connection have 
been identified as illegal and have been demolished. These include Joseph Chinotimba 
in Glen View, Ivhu Rakauya in Aspindale, Chazezesa in Kuwadzana, Tashinga in Dzivar-
asekwa 2, Mujibha naChimbwido and Cain Nkala among others (Mawonde 2015).
In the next paragraphs, we explore how cooperatives work as a political strategy 
theoretically.
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Case studies of housing cooperatives in greater Harare
In the case studies, we seek to proffer an outline of how distributive politics, clientilism 
and patronage take center stage in the context of housing co-operatives. The co-opera-
tive that have been formed due to the state’s incapacity to provide public goods in the 
form of housing, indicate that the majority of them are linked to ZANU-PF.
Table 1 Charactering Some Harare’s Housing Cooperatives













2008 None Budiriro 3 126 126 No significant 
progress has 
been done
Ndezvatenzi 2014 None Glen View 78 No data No data
Sangorinopawan-
eta
2008 None Glen View 12 12 Servicing nearly 
complete
















2011 ZANU PF Mabvuku/
Tafara






Holy Cross 2011 None Budiriro 3 50 50 Servicing in 
progress
Pamuzinda 2002 ZANU PF Crowborough 
North 
Scheme
21 15 8 units com-
plete
Chombouta 2008 ZANU PF Kuwadzana 240 164 Servicing in 
progress, 




Kugarikakushinga 1996 ZANU PF Mabvuku 1,300 423 423 housing 
units com-
pleted
Hebert Chitepo 2012 ZANU PF Kuwadzana 
Extension
575 99 Servicing in 
progress
Mupedzahondo 1998 ZANU PF Kuwadazana 60 31 31 units com-
pleted
Freedom 2014 ZANU PF Glen View No data 44 Unknown
Kubatana 2014 None Chadcombe No data 25 Unknown
Empowered 
Women
2014 ZANU PF Kuwadzana No Data 12 Unknown
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Case 1: Leopold housing co‑operative
Leopold Takawira Housing Cooperative (LTHC) is a cooperative registered under the 
Co-operatives Act. Located along the High Glen Road across Old Marimba suburb, in 
Harare, LTHC was formed in 2004 by Innocent Pedzisai a nephew to the late libera-
tion war hero Leopold Takawira. Innocent Pedzisai, the founder of the co-operative is 
currently the Legislator for Chirumanzu south representing ZANU PF in that constitu-
ency. This is a clear manifestation of the politics of housing. After its formation, the co-
operative negotiated for land from the Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and 
National Housing. A piece of land was identified for them along Harare drive opposite 
Marimba Flats near the municipal water tanks, which saves areas like Rugare and Kam-
buzuma. The co-operative was given the offer letter for the land which was valued at 
US$2 100,000. The land was subdivided and 814 residential stands were produced with 
an average stand size of 400 m2. According to one official of the co-operative member-
ship to this project was open to everyone despite one’s political affiliation. The main rea-
son for this was that the cooperative wanted the project to be successful and as such 
one‘s income was the most important aspect that they considered to be a member of 
the co-operative. To join the co-op one would pay a joining fee of US$500. A stand was 
then allocated. The monthly subscriptions have been fluctuating over the past years and 
ranged between $30 in 2009 to $50 in 2010–2012 and currently $100. To date (end of 
2014), the co-operative has managed to open gravel roads whilst water and sewer draw-
ings are now in place and they expect to complete the basic infrastructure by end 2015.
No doubt, Leopold Takawira Housing Co-operative is linked to ZANU PF. The key 
informant interviewed has acknowledged this. Although the members claim to be from 
different political backgrounds sometimes, the cooperative mobilizes them into attend-
ing ZANU PF meetings. The key informant purports the cooperative does not force 
anyone to attend, this is unlike ZANU PF practice. This seems to contradict the usual 
ZANU PF practice, which always forces people to attend its rallies. Now, the co-opera-
tive is facing challenges when dealing with Harare city council. Some of these perceived 
challenges includes delays in the approval of water and sewer drawings and allegations 
of not following planning standards in the preparation of layout plans. Most of the 
challenges being faced by the co-operative emanate from the fact that they are among 
a group of co-operatives which are illegally occupying reserved open spaces in Harare. 
These co-operatives are motivated to do so because they are linked to Zanu PF which 
is the ruling part and most of the leaders in these co-operatives are war vetereans and 
as such there is an element of force when dealing with the local authority resulting in 
conflict. It was noted that in Mufakose, five housing co-operatives were granted author-
ity by Zanu PF leadership to build on illegal space and among these are Joshua Nkomo 
Housing Co-operative, Leopold Takawira Housing Co-operative, Parkview Housing Pay 
Scheme. Beneficiaries of these co-operatives have vowed to continue building as they are 
pretty sure that they have got the support of their political leadership and the only action 
that the local authority can take is to legalise these developments.
All these unfolding scenarios in Harare are a clear testimony that land is being used 
as a tool by ZANU PF to mobilise support in urban areas and thus creating and enforc-
ing the patron-client relationship. Whether it legal or illegal the client seems to be very 
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confident that the Patron will not let them down as they have all the papers and this loy-
alty will most likely work in favour of the party come election times.
Case study 2: Chombouta housing co‑operative
Chombouta Housing Co-operative was formed in 2004 and is based in Kuwadzana and 
it has got 240 members. In Kuwadzana, the co-operative managed to get a piece of land 
which has got 115 stands averaging 350 m2 in size. The co-operative purports to be open 
to all members of the public who are in need of a house in Harare. It uses the waiting list 
criteria for its members to benefit stands as and when they became available and it was 
not clear on the monthly subscriptions, which the members are supposed to pay. Contri-
butions go towards purchasing the land as well as servicing but individuals will meet the 
costs of their houses. At the current project site the co-operative has managed to open 
roads, water and sewer reticulation are now in place. Since the cooperative is over sub-
scribed against the available land the respondent pointed out that they are still looking 
for more land to accommodate those who have not yet benefited.
Coming to the origin and meaning of the co-operative name any Zimbabwean can tell 
that there is a lot of political connotation in it. Chombo means a weapon. This can be 
used to destroy or to build. On the other hand, [Ignatius] Chombo is the surname for 
the long standing Minister of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing 
from ZANU PF. In this case, one might be tempted to say he is the patron who supports 
the co-operative to acquire land in Harare. Despite the inappropriateness of the piece 
of land for residential development since it is rocky and hilly the co-operative managed 
to get the land. Recently in its bid to acquire more land, the co-operative has been the 
subject of debate between city of Harare Finance and Housing committees on the best 
possible use for a portion of land in Kuwadzana. According to planning requirements 
in Zimbabwe as guided by the Regional, Town and Country planning Act, a permit is 
required before any development or change of use of property is undertaken. A person 
wanting to carry out any operations or change of use can consult the local authority for 
guidance. Some applications are subject to the requirements that public notice must be 
given in respect of them and owners of adjacent properties must be notified. Therefore, 
in this case it is important that the case be brought to the attention of the public before a 
decision can be made. This is because the issue relates to a development which could in 
the opinion of the local planning authority, have an adverse effect or impact on the local-
ity of the area in question. However, the truth is that most of these cases are not being 
brought to the attention of the public and decisions are being made without meaningful 
public participation.
Discussion and policy implications
Emerging from the foregoing paragraphs are a number of observations that have very 
critical underpinnings for policy and the practice of housing urban residents in Harare. 
We have argued strongly that housing cooperatives are a tool for clientilism. The urban 
residents that are homeless are the clients that approach identified elites, usually politi-
cians, who then work hard to ensure that they get the land. Viewing housing cooperatives 
as a form of political clientilism calls into question many theoretical understandings of 
cooperatives including aspects of social capital and self-help. Access and control of land 
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is major bait for manipulation and control of the urban homeless by regimes and politi-
cal parties like ZANU PF. Because the urban low-income groups are poorly resourced, 
they see cooperatives as the vehicle through which they can have their voice heard to 
access land primarily and then to work together and mobilize critical resources needed 
to service the land (once they access it) and to put up their structures. In most cases, 
the average household ensures that it has a roof over its head and as a cooperative, they 
lobby for parallel development in which they are allowed to build the houses before they 
have put the road infrastructure and related services. In certain places, as demonstrated 
in the paper, the inhabitants have to devise coping strategies, which are costly. Housing 
cooperatives seem to promote the good governance ideal that is a contested issue. The 
other critical observation is that housing cooperatives in Greater Harare have tended to 
undermine access to public goods for those who are not politically connected. Overall, 
housing (and land for housing) in Africa should be understood as a form of distributive 
politics. In the Case of Greater Harare, the politics of who get what, where and how is 
quite popular, especially in the emerging housing cooperative areas such as Chombouta 
housing cooperative, Hopley, Southlea park, Epworth and Hatcliffe among others. These 
are places where the political elites identify pieces of vacant land and allocate them to 
their loyalists on a patronage basis. Those who are not politically connected find it very 
difficult to access land for housing. Land resources particularly in the peri-urban areas 
in vulnerable to voter opportunism by key political figures, especially those connected to 
the ruling party ZANU-PF. There are instances when politics assist in housing and when 
it does not.
Conclusion
The thrust of this paper has been to argue that the rise of housing cooperatives in 
Greater Harare, Zimbabwe is a direct response to the failure of the State and its appa-
ratus to provision of public goods to the urban residents. Political elites and ZANU PF 
in particular have used this shortcoming as an advantage for them to practice some dis-
tributive politics over the scarce resource of urban land for housing. Access to housing 
land is a major asset that individuals seeking to build own homes have to find means to 
achieve. Although the MDC has prided itself as having the majority of urban votes, it 
non-capacity in controlling the urban land resource has worked out against it as ZANU 
PF has observed this gap, which it has capitalized to exploit. To get access to the people, 
the idea of housing cooperatives has been a welcome development to ZANU PF. In the 
Greater Harare urban (and peri-urban) landscape as elsewhere in the country, the inter-
nal dynamics of housing cooperatives provides them with critical power to control their 
members especially financial and labor contributions that aid social capital dynamics. 
We have demonstrated that, urban land in Harare (as many other urban centers in the 
countries) remains a prerogative of the state that the ZANU PF regime has controlled for 
more than three decades. Housing cooperatives in Greater Harare have tried to identify 
with ZANU PF hence has become a tool in which ZANU PF has re-asserted its influ-
ence and hegemony. The study has been critical in unraveling critical patterns of devel-
opment embedded in cities which urban planning and other disciplines should never 
take for granted in their quest to bring up interventions. Indeed, urban planning is not 
in any way apolitical. Housing, in particular, is a ‘political hot potato’. There is need for 
Page 13 of 13Chirisa et al. Bandung J of Global South  (2015) 2:15 
the designing of policies to ensure that households, individuals and families do not suffer 
development exclusion chiseled along political lines.
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